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Teksty
po polsku
The
Selectional Force of Reasons
Practical
Responsibility
How
Not to Miss a Missing Premise and How to Miss and Not Missing
One: The Case of the Lewis Carroll's Tortoise
Do
Selectional Explanations Apply to Individual-Level Facts? Some
Comments on E. Sober’s Conception of Selectional
Explanations, forthcoming.
On
Willfully Contrarious Beliefs, in (eds.) Jerzy
Brzeziński, Andrzej Klawiter, Theo A.F. Kuipers, Krzysztof
Łastowski, Katarzyna Paprzycka, Piotr Przybysz, The
Courage to Do Philosophy. Essays Presented to
Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi,
2007).
Trying
Slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby Account for Mistakes and Slips?,
Philosophia 35 (2005), 173-216.
How
a Type-Type Identity Theorist Can Be a Non-Reductionist: An
Answer from the Idealizational Conception of Science, [w:] Donald
Gillies (red.), Laws and Models in
Science (London: King’s
College Publications, 2004), pp. 113–128.
Response
to Marcel Weber’s Comment, [w:] Donald Gillies (red.),
Laws and Models in Science
(London: King’s College Publications,
2004), pp. 133–136.
Using
Short Animated Presentations (SAPs) in Teaching Elementary Logic,
Teaching Philosophy 27-4,
2004, 325-336.
Teaching
Logic as a Foreign Language On-Line, Teaching
Philosophy 27, 2 (2004), 117 125.
False
Consciousness of Intentional Psychology, Philosophical
Psychology 15-3 (2002), 271-295.
Flickers
of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New
Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory,
Journal of Philosophical Research 27
(2002), 553-565.
Idealization in Unitarian Metaphysics, Axiomates 11
(2000), 7-19.
Normative
Expectations, Intentions and Beliefs, The Southern Journal
of Philosophy, 37-4 (1999), 629-652.
Socrates
Meets Carnap: Explication in the Theaetetus,
Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 2 (1999), 87-108.
Collectivism
on the Horizon: A Challenge to Pettit’s Critique of
Collectivism, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998),
165-181.
Must
False Consciousness Be Rationally Caused?, Philosophy
of the Social Sciences 28-1 (1998),
69-82.
How
Carnap Should Bite Goodman’s Bullet, Philosophia
24 (1994), 149-156.
A
Paradox in Hobbes’ Philosophy of Law? in: (eds.)
L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki, Social
Systems, Rationality and Revolution (Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1993), pp. 41-50.
How Do
Enslaved People Make Revolutions, with M. Paprzycki, in:
(eds.) L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki, Social Systems,
Rationality and Revolution (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp.
251-263.
The
Master and Slave Configuration in Hegel’s System, in:
(eds.) L. Nowak, M. Paprzycki, Social Systems,
Rationality and Revolution (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp.
83-104.
Carnap
and Leibniz on the Problem of Being, Poznań
Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities
28 (1992), 163-177.
Accuracy,
Essentiality and Idealization, with M. Paprzycki, in: (eds.) J.
Brzeziński, L. Nowak, Idealization III:
Approximation and Truth (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991), pp.
255-265.
How
do Idealizational Statements Apply to Reality?, in: (eds.) J.
Brzeziński, L. Nowak, Idealization
III: Approximation and Truth (Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1991), pp. 239-250.
A
Note on the Unitarian Explication of Idealization, with M.
Paprzycki, in: (eds.) J. Brzeziński, L. Nowak, Idealization
III: Approximation and Truth (Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1991), pp. 263-265.
Reduction
and Correspondence in the Idealizational Conception of Science,
in: (eds.) Brzeziński, J., Coniglione, F.,
Kuipers, T.A.F., Nowak, L., Idealization I
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989), pp. 277-286.
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